I feel that in any discussion of the self, the definitions of what we mean by "the self" can always become muddled as we are still only in the frontiers of discovery regarding consciousness, what it is, or what it means to have consciousness, or be conscious. Therefore, as this essay deals heavily with ideas of the self, or the lack thereof, please be patient if definitions waver and employ some level of suspension of belief in order to better appreciate the overall ideas discussed.
In Albert Camus'
essay, “They Myth of Sisyphus,” where he discusses the notion of
the ancient Greek tale of Sisyphus, a man doomed to roll a large rock
up a hill only to have it roll back down once at the top. The
Buddha's discussions on non-self help support the suffering Sisyphus
endures and Camus' treatment of how one can overcome
suffering—resolving the existential crisis suffering brings.
However, there is one major distinction between the two. The
treatment of suffering in “The Myth of Sisyphus” allows for a
mastery over it. Acknowledging the suffering as a part of existence
brings a moment “when man glances backward over his life . . .
returning to [one's] rock . . . he contemplates that series of
unrelated actions which becomes his fate . . . combined under his
memories eye and soon sealed by his death” (Camus 123). It is not
his ability to call upon memory, but that he has memories, or events
that are shared with other's. His importance is not only in the life
that he led or the actions he performed, but in the lives that he
affected, (or in the case of Sisyphus the lives affected through his
story). In this, existence can be viewed as the effects humanity
brings upon each other; the “self” is that of empathy, or
relations. Therefore, the self is viewed through the relationships
that can be made, and a responsibility in keeping those relationships
not only alive, but alive in memory.
The
self cannot only be accounted for through human connections, but
through the physicality of the universe. And so, perhaps, viewing the
self should not be on such a narrow bases as one human or one being,
but the whole of beginnings, or the whole of “all things.” The
seventeenth century philosopher, Benedict de Spinoza wrote in his
book, The Ethics, on
substances. “By substance I understand what is in itself and is
conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not
require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed”
(1). In other words X—or in this case the Self—is a substance if
you don't need to look outside the idea of X in order to explain it.
Spinoza later labels this substance “God in nature” (10). His
ideas, in essence, are the same as the Buddha's non-self. The Buddha
says that if there were a self, it would not tend towards destruction
(Siderits 38), but that it would be enduring. Spinoza sees this same
dilemma but looks at all nature as God. Or rather, all things
perceivable as God, as it is essential in his philosophy that the
only substance that can exist is the substance of all things—God.
For the buddha, we can replace the word “God” and put in its
place “Self”.
In
this idea of the self is the ability to look for the self not only
within one of the skandhas, but in all. The skandha vijnana
describes an objects awareness,
or its consciousness and we can see this through humanities awareness
of the universe. Through the many species and races of intelligent
life the universe is aware of itself and will continue to be aware of
itself through the notion of energy, and how it can neither be created nor
destroyed. The author, Dan Simmons, in his essay on writing well,
“Zen and the Art of Writing Well,” says, in regards to this idea,
“We have become one of the universe’s eyes and hearts and minds by which the universe can contemplate itself. The mistake there is to start believing that you, part of that observing We, are somehow more important or central than the universe we are so imperfectly designed to observe. It is as if one photoreceptive cell in one’s eye were to suddenly believe that it was the pinnacle of all evolution and the darling of creation simply because it can receive the impression of a photon.”
This self, we can begin to understand is all encompassing, and not simply that of individual beings. Furthermore, we see
that impression must be accompanied with expression. It is through
one's expression that we are able to understand the impressions of
the universe—or rather, the expression given through the universe's
structure allow for impressions of the self.
The
skandha sankharas, that
of habit, desire, volition, etc., can be viewed in a multitude of
ways. They can again be expressed through those things of
intelligence, or through the “habits” of the universe. Such as
laws or those unchanging aspects that govern how the universe works.
Further, the Buddha teaches that the self is unchanging. “Anything dependent on what is not-Self much itself be not-Self.” (Edelglass et al 270). The self, in the case of Spinoza's God in nature, or the entirety of the universe can be explained through the underbelly of cause that brings the universe about. Those laws of physics that govern the universe allow for its diversity, while yet, remaining unchanged and constant.
It therefore seems that the Buddha's understanding of the self was too narrow. It is a broader view of the self that allows
a greater importance, or even a necessity of empathy; it allows for
empathy to play a major role within the whole view of what the self
can contain, or the notion that the universe is a self. One that is
enduring, and whose purpose and essence (the underlining structure)
is non-changing (laws of nature, etc). While the facets, or
“personality” is continually progressing forward.
Works Cited
1. Camus,
Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus, and Other Essays.
New York: Vintage, 1991. Print.
2. Simmons,
Dan. "Zen and the Art of Writing Well." Dansimmons.com.
N.p., June 2008. Web. 09 Mar. 2014.
3. Pascual-Leone,
Alvaro, Amir Amedi, Felipe Fregni, and Lotfi B. Merabet. "The
Plastic Human Brain Cortex." Annual Review of Neuroscience 28.1
(2005): 377-401. Print.
4. Spinoza,
Benedictus De. Ethics.
Trans. E. M. Curley. London: Penguin, 1996. Print.
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